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ABSTRACT
Countries all around the world use energy policy to achieve access 
to energy resources, such as natural gas and oil, which can lead to 
energy security and self-sufficiency as well as economic growth 
and geo-political advantages. As oil and gas exploration and 
production continues to be a priority within national energy politics 
in producer countries around the world, oil and gas companies and 
government bodies are implementing regulations to help enhance 
the sustainability of the industry. One of the challenges of twenty-first 
century is to meet demand and provide the world with enough energy 
in a safe and sustainable way. A range of case study data is used, from 
which a sample of 10 countries within Europe with similar institutional 
quality, political stability and regulatory platform was selected. 
Recommendations for petroleum sector governance and sustainable 
administrative design, respectively, which will positively impact 
petroleum sector performance and meet stakeholders’ expectations, 
were defined. This study indicates that a country implementing 
separate functions in administrative design will improve petroleum 
sector performance and address identified key success factors which 
will correspondingly meet stakeholders’ expectations, but most 
importantly, it will manage the petroleum sector in order to create 
wealth for the nation and ensure sustainability.
1. Introduction
Since the nineteenth century petroleum has become the world’s most important inter-
nationally traded commodity. Petroleum is an essential part of the products we use on a 
daily basis. Natural gas and oil have been major global energy resources for many decades. 
In 2013, oil accounted for 39.9% of the world energy mix, while gas accounted for 15.1% 
(International Energy Agency, 2015). Both of these resources play an important role in 
global industry, and are unlikely to be replaced in the foreseeable future.
Countries throughout the world use energy policy in order to achieve geopolitical and 
economic advantages and to position themselves globally. The greater their access to energy 
resources such as natural gas and oil, the better their position in showing their power while 
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making other countries dependent. A country’s ability to access energy supplies and the ways 
in which it uses energy crucially determine the state of its economy, its national security 
and the quality and sustainability of its environment (Shaffer, 2011). While the price of oil 
is ultimately determined by basic supply and demand pressures, international politics play 
a large part as well (Falola & Genova, 2005). With the current trend of politics and stand-
ardisation of different policies – especially if we look to the example of the European Union 
and how different policies are implemented based on European Union legislation – energy 
policy is fundamental to creating a country’s national politics, since it is very dependent on 
the resources a country has, and can make a difference among countries in terms of power.
When the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.) was established 
in 1960, the balance of strength between oil companies and producer countries was gradually 
shifted in favour of countries (Ryggvik, 2010). In the past 50 years, this has enabled coun-
tries around the world to create wealth and economic growth based on natural resources 
through national politics and regulations.
Industrialised countries with cheap energy resources such as the United States, Canada, 
and West European countries demonstrate that other countries can similarly achieve positive 
and sustainable economic growth, depending on the life of the resource and changes in 
demand. Energy resources can also provide the necessary facilitator for the development 
of other sectors of the economy. One of the most important sources of the real sector is 
the energy factor, and it has important impacts on real sector mechanisms and thus influ-
ences the economic growth process (Altunbas & Kapusuzoglu, 2011). When it comes to 
exploration and production of oil and gas, industrialised countries manage these resources 
in a way that assures the security of oil and gas company investments while decreasing a 
country’s dependency on imports, enabling better prices to industry and society in general 
and having positive impacts on the state budget when it comes to fiscal regimes1. If the 
process is well managed, all stakeholders will have benefits and the country itself will have 
positive economic growth.
If natural resources cannot be developed and exploited to create wealth for the nation, 
the result may be poverty and deprivation (Quashie, 2007). This is observed in undeveloped 
countries, such as in Africa and the Middle East where only individuals benefit from the 
reserves these countries have. In countries that did not establish political stability prior to 
developing an oil industry, achieving economic growth and stability within an environment 
that is often plagued by corruption, poverty and cultural tension is very difficult (Falola & 
Genova, 2005). In many countries, natural resources have contributed to political instability 
and corruption, and in some cases also warfare (Holden, 2013).
Due to the fact that petroleum plays vital role in economic growth in oil-producing 
countries, it is important how countries around the world govern and regulate petroleum 
resources. Rents from oil and gas can contribute up to 70% of a country’s G.D.P. (Kemal, 
2016). Rents are regulated through fiscal regime (petroleum taxation model) and lead petro-
leum sector performance. A country can create wealth from petroleum resources through 
proper petroleum governance, and thus it is the administrative model which boosts petro-
leum sector performance in oil-producing countries. The regulation and taxation system 
should ensure that the oil revenues are exploited in a safe and profitable way, and that the 
bulk of the oil revenues are reaped by the state (Holden, 2013).
Sustainable development and economic growth can be achieved through the rational 
development and exploitation of energy resources. For a country, it is imperative to secure 
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stable supplies of energy in order to achieve and maintain progress in economic activity. 
Global competition for acquiring energy and mineral resources remains difficult, posing a 
challenge to countries in obtaining stable and affordable energy.
As oil and gas exploration and production continues to be a priority within national 
energy politics in producer countries around the world, oil and gas companies and govern-
ment (state) bodies are implementing regulations to help enhance the sustainability of the 
industry. One of the challenges of the twenty-first century is to meet demand and provide 
the world with enough energy in a safe and sustainable way.
It is important for a country in general to adopt an administrative model according to 
which exploration and production of mineral resources such as natural gas and oil will 
enable sustainability, energy independence and development of other industrial sectors of 
the economy.
In developed countries such as Norway, natural resources have been used to benefit 
the country, leading to higher growth and income (Holden, 2013). Norway has achieved 
great success in managing its petroleum resources, and provides an example of how those 
resources can be administrated within government institutions in order to benefit from their 
natural potential and enable production and industry development out of those resources. 
At a very early stage, Norway implemented an administrative design according to which 
functions are separated within three government-controlled bodies: a commercial, a poli-
cy-making and a regulatory body (Thurber, Hults, & Heller, 2011). Within the petroleum 
sector, the Norwegian administrative design of separated functions is seen as the best prac-
tice model, even though it has been shown that a lack of institutional quality and political 
stability is not a prerequisite for good oil sector performance (Thurber et al., 2011). It is 
important to note that Norway was already a stable democracy when the administrative 
design of separated functions was implemented, and therefore it is hard to assess to what 
extent the Norwegian experience can be copied by countries with an entirely different 
political and economic phase of development (Holden, 2013). Norway accepts large costs 
and large risks in the system as it is today, but for a nation with lower and less liquid per 
capita wealth, the risk will be less welcome (Lund, 2014).
In general, there is a lot of research on petroleum sector performance, best practices and 
cases around the world. Moreover, a lot of research has been done on various cases within 
different countries, as well as research on petroleum sector effects on industry and society, 
but there is no single approach on how to design an administrative model in order to gain 
benefits for all stakeholders involved in the process and create wealth. Therefore, the main 
question which is elaborated in this study is how to set up an administrative design which 
will be efficient and acceptable for different groups of stakeholders involved in the process 
such as government, society, non-governmental organisations (N.G.O.s), and oil companies. 
In order to derive recommendations, three specific research questions, which we will answer 
in this study, were defined. First: is the Norwegian administrative design acceptable within 
different groups of stakeholders? Second: what are the conditions of the administrative 
design which makes it acceptable for different groups of stakeholders? Third: what are the 
key success factors which will enable development of a sustainable administrative design 
acceptable for all stakeholders?
To answer these research questions, a sample of 10 countries within Europe was selected 
and various case study data2 were used in order to individually focus on each country’s 
administrative design of the petroleum sector. The Norwegian case is used as industry best 
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practice, and patterns with other chosen cases from Europe were compared. The focus was 
on five cases from countries which are involved in North Sea petroleum production (U.K., 
Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark together with Norway) and five cases from countries 
which are involved in Mediterranean petroleum production (Cyprus, Albania, Italy, Greece, 
and Malta). Not all countries selected are among the top oil-producing countries due to 
the fact that previous research showed that in order to implement the Norwegian Model a 
country needs to be a stable democracy. Thurber et al. (2011) argued that countries which 
lack institutional quality and political stability are not able to implement the Norwegian 
administrative design in order to increase petroleum sector performance. Therefore, coun-
tries which are active in exploration and production to a certain extent and have similar 
institutional quality and political stability and similar regulatory platforms were chosen. 
Since European countries have similar political and regulatory frameworks, the selected 
countries are either European Union members or are in the stage of qualifying to enter 
the European Union (Albania). This research argues that the Norwegian Model will influ-
ence petroleum sector performance among countries with a stable democracy. Moreover, 
recommendations for sustainable administrative design were developed, and key success 
factors which will enable development of a sustainable administrative design acceptable 
for all stakeholders included in the process were defined.
In order to address the research questions, relevant theory on how Norwegian admin-
istrative design functions in relation to different stakeholders included in the process was 
used. Then, the research method, hypotheses and hypotheses testing with case study data 
were explained. Data in case study descriptions were summarised and results were presented. 
Finally, a broad discussion of results was completed, together with the speculations and 
interpretations of the results in terms of administrative design organisation and its rela-
tion to petroleum sector performance and stakeholders’ expectation. The study concludes 
with concrete recommendations on how the administrative design should be structured 
and developed by reformers and policy makers in order to influence petroleum sector 
performance within different countries which have relatively strong institutional quality 
and political stability.
2. Theoretical background
Norway implemented a separated functions administrative design in 1972, called the 
Norwegian Model, which is seen as a prerequisite for better performance and high trans-
parency in managing the petroleum sector (Al-Kasim, 2006). Moreover, the Norwegian 
Model was based on 10 points which were supposed to assure that energy resources are 
exploited in a way that benefits the whole society, the so called ‘10 commandments’ of 
Norwegian oil activities (Ryggvik, 2010). The points on which the Norwegian Model was 
built were developed after comprehensive discussions and debates with different stakehold-
ers, and were based on national governance and control of all activities, country energy 
independence, new industrial sector development based on petroleum which will not be 
in conflict with existing business activities, high technical standards and environmental 
protection, and infrastructure development (Ryggvik, 2010). The management of petroleum 
resources reflects the view among Norwegian decision makers that these resources belong 
to the nation, and that their development should benefit society as a whole, including 
future generations (Holden, 2013). Holden (2013) has argued that the quality of political 
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institutions, reliable public bureaucracy, little corruption and a transparent fiscal regime are 
essential in order to perceive a country as an attractive area for business, and thus enable 
economic growth led by natural resources. Norway recognised from the start that the key 
for profit maximisation, as well as control over its new petroleum industry, is an unwavering 
commitment to government participation and strict regulations (Falola & Genova, 2005).
Norway’s separated functions administrative design has been analysed in depth by several 
authors. Al-Kasim (2006) has made an in-depth analysis of the Norwegian Model which 
is the so-called best practice model when it comes to petroleum sector management. The 
author has identified prerequisites under which the Norwegian Model functions, such as the 
prospectivity of the resource base, the enabling market environment, and the capability of 
the country to mobilise institutional, financial and technological resources. He argues that 
the administrative design should ensure a sustainable benefit for the nation, the primary 
intention of the Norwegian Model. Thurber et al. (2011) went a step further and argued that 
a Norwegian administrative design of separated functions will not function in countries with 
low institutional quality and political stability. In their study, they analysed oil-producing 
countries which tried to implement the Norwegian Model after witnessing Norway’s great 
success in managing petroleum sector performance. Their study pointed out that changes 
in petroleum governance will be successful and bring positive effects only if there is political 
stability and institutional quality. This argument was further elaborated in another study 
pointing out that the economic impact due to changes in petroleum governance might be 
contingent on political conditions (Kemal, 2016). Kemal (2016) suggested that a country 
which creates a separate regulatory entity and makes the national oil company merely a 
business entity increases its aggregate domestic income by around 10%.
Norway is recognised for an administrative design model whose functions are separated 
among three government-controlled bodies. The policy-making body is organised within 
the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Ministry) which oversees the process of explora-
tion and production rights. A separate regulatory body called the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate is responsible for supervision of all activities done by the oil companies and 
petroleum profit collection, as well as advising the Ministry on technical matters. Finally, a 
commercial body represented by the Norwegian national oil company is actively involved 
in petroleum operations in Norway and abroad.
The policy-making body has an essential role in regulatory framework development. 
Petroleum regulations set clear rules on exploration and production rights, technical and 
environment protection requirements and a fiscal regime. The fiscal regime or petroleum 
taxation model, which in simple terms is the government take versus the oil company 
take, is what makes a real difference among countries, and from which both the country 
and the oil company can benefit if there is optimum balance. Technical and environmental 
requirements are standardised as well as exploration and production rights; geological 
potential is given by nature, while the diversity of fiscal regimes is what makes countries 
unique (Johnston, 1994). Johnston (2003) argues that fiscal regime, if balanced and regu-
lated properly in terms of government take versus oil company take, can attract significant 
investments in exploration and production activities and create wealth for the nation. If 
two countries have similar geological potential in terms of oil and gas resources, the higher 
the government take, the greater the probability of creating wealth for the nation. In order 
to determine attractiveness of the fiscal regime, government take is combined with other 
measures of profitability, fiscal system flexibility, revenue risk, and fiscal stability in order to 
124   B. DORIC AND V. DIMOVSKI
properly assess petroleum fiscal regime (Agalliu, 2011). Moreover, depending on regulation 
requirements, besides direct effects which are achieved through fiscal regime, indirect effects 
can be achieved in terms of industry and infrastructure development. Norway addressed 
this and boosted petroleum industry development through participation of the national oil 
company in exploration and production activities, as well as infrastructure development of 
an oil and gas pipeline system to convey petroleum deposits (Ryggvik, 2010).
A separate regulatory body is responsible for supervising all activities and regulatory 
requirements in order to assure that oil companies are performing their obligations accord-
ing to the regulations. Their most important role is petroleum profit control, based on the 
monthly production and control of capital and operating expenditures of the oil compa-
nies, as well as exploration and production operations control. The regulatory body has 
the power to benchmark and create positive knowledge transfer between a commercial 
body (national oil company) and oil companies operating in the country (Kemal, 2016 and 
Thurber et al., 2011).
A commercial body, which in the case of Norway is currently represented by the national 
oil company Petoro, while historically was represented by national oil company Statoil, is 
responsible for industry development. Statoil is actively involved in all exploration and 
production activities as well as in refining, processing and pipeline operations. With Statoil, 
the Norwegian contractor industry was built and played an important role in Norwegian 
industrial development (Ryggvik, 2010). Statoil had a privileged position in Norway for 
20 years, and it was placed on an equal position with other oil companies in the market 
when Norway entered into European Economic Area agreement with the European Union 
(Lund, 2014).
In successfully addressing the identified points within a separated functions adminis-
trative design, Norway has also been able to address stakeholders’ expectations. Four main 
groups of stakeholders included in the process were identified: government, society, N.G.O.s 
and oil companies. All of the stakeholders identified have one thing in common: transpar-
ency of activities. Government expectations are focused on economic growth, which can be 
partially achieved through direct effects in terms of fiscal regime, which enables direct cash 
for the state budget (Ryggvik, 2010). Moreover, from a government perspective, in terms of 
economic growth, the main focus is on encouraging new investments in the country and 
foreign direct investments (F.D.I.), thus increasing the state budget through fiscal regime, 
direct and indirect industry development, availability of energy resources, and enabling 
energy independency and security (Tordo, 2013).
Societal expectations are very broad, and can influence all individuals based on the 
territory where exploration and production operations are being performed. Expectations 
include the protection and preservation of the environment, and therefore exploration and 
production activities are expected to be performed in a sustainable way while enabling cheap 
energy resources, higher living standards, and nation development in general (Ryggvik, 
2010 and Tordo, 2013). Society (nation) expectations are achieved through wealth creation, 
which is enabled through the fiscal regime and industry development.
The primary concern of N.G.O.s is environmental preservation. The participation and 
influence of N.G.O.s in environmental governance has increased enormously over the 
last decades (Oberthür et al., 2003), and it is therefore important to include N.G.O.s in 
the constant development and improvement of environmental standards defined within 
a regulatory framework. According to the Norwegian Model, the expectations of N.G.O.s 
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about environment preservation were fulfilled through technological and environment 
protection standards and transparent administrative design for managing the petroleum 
sector (Ryggvik, 2010).
From an oil company perspective, it is all about security and stability of investments, 
which is very connected with the regulatory framework of the environment in which an oil 
company would like to invest: a low risk of investment and high rates of return (Randall, 
2008). For oil companies this is all about investment risk assessment, which is again depend-
ent on the fiscal regime and a transparent regulatory framework, with the assumption that 
there is a positively evaluated geological potential of the country.
According to the theory discussed above, it can be concluded that the points on which 
the Norwegian Model is based are essential for meeting stakeholders’ expectations, due to 
the fact that they address different stakeholders’ expectations as well as sustainability. These 
points can be grouped by five criteria which, for the purposes of this study, will be called 
key success factors for administrative design development related to petroleum sector per-
formance. These factors are national governance and control of petroleum sector; clusters 
(industry) development; infrastructure development; environmental protection and high 
technical standards; and balanced government take.
3. Hypothesis development
Based on the theory addressed in the previous chapter the following three hypotheses were 
defined:
Hypothesis 1. Exportability of the Norwegian Model in terms of separated policy, regulatory 
and commercial functions between different government bodies is correlated with petroleum 
sector performance.
In order to test this hypothesis for each of the 10 selected countries, whether and how 
separation of the functions is implemented in terms of policy, regulatory and commer-
cial responsibilities and how it is linked with petroleum sector performance was defined. 
Hypothesis 1 will be strengthened by a finding that countries with higher petroleum sector 
performance have implemented the Norwegian Model.
An extensive case study data approach, as mentioned earlier, was used. The case study 
data provides an in-depth examination of the policy and regulatory frameworks governing 
the petroleum sector for each country, and focuses on regulation rules and responsibilities 
within different government bodies. For each country, it is readily seen how a fiscal regime 
is regulated, the government take versus oil company take compared, and which institutions 
are responsible for policy-making, regulatory control and commercial activities identified. 
Furthermore, we can examine how exploration and production rights are regulated in terms 
of durability and performance, how technical and environmental protection requirements 
are regulated, and we can consider geological potential assessment in terms of maturity, 
and the historical development of the petroleum sector.
In order to evaluate petroleum sector performance the study will focus on petroleum 
revenues which go directly to the state budget. As discussed earlier in the theoretical part 
of the study, the major differentiation among various countries is the fiscal regime in terms 
of government take when it comes to petroleum profit. Due to the fact that actual produc-
tion quantities are different within sample countries and are very dependent on a country’s 
geological potential, which cannot be influenced, the focus will be on government take 
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percentage, which demonstrates the capability of a country to generate profit from the 
petroleum sector. In addition to government take, a thorough evaluation of petroleum sector 
performance must take into consideration the capability of a country to develop petroleum 
sector activities. This capability can be measured in terms of consistency of exploration and 
production activities based on historical data for each country. Oil companies are attracted 
to invest in exploration activities where the outcome is establishment of new production 
facilities, and therefore countries which are able to facilitate more exploration activities 
have a higher probability of increasing petroleum production. This study will not focus on 
actual production since it is very dependent on geological potential and therefore differs 
between various countries. Finally, based on the findings associated with government take 
and consistency of exploration and production activities within sample countries, for the 
purposes of this study petroleum sector performance will be evaluated as good or poor.
Hypothesis 2. Petroleum sector performance can be improved if the petroleum sector adminis-
trative design addresses identified key success factors.
In order to test this hypothesis for each of the 10 selected countries, we will define whether 
the administrative design addresses national governance and control of petroleum sector 
activities, technical requirements, environmental protection requirements, industrial sec-
tor development through national oil company and/or local contractor companies, infra-
structure development and government take for the state budget, and how it is linked with 
petroleum sector performance. If analysis shows that countries with higher petroleum 
sector performance have addressed in their administrative design national governance 
and control of petroleum sector activities, technical requirements, environment protection 
requirements, industrial sector development through national oil company and/or local 
contractor companies, infrastructure development and government take for the state budget, 
this hypothesis will be confirmed.
Hypothesis 3. Countries with a separated functions administrative design of the petroleum sector 
meet stakeholders’ expectations.
In order to test this hypothesis for each of the 10 selected countries, we will define whether 
the administrative design addresses the Norwegian Model of separated functions and 
whether the administrative design addresses national governance and control of petroleum 
sector activities, technical requirements, environment protection requirements, industrial 
sector development through national oil company and/or local contractor companies, infra-
structure development and government take for the state budget. If analysis shows that 
countries with an administrative design which addresses policy, regulatory and commercial 
separation of function have also addressed factors such as national governance and control 
of petroleum sector activities, technical requirements, environment protection require-
ments, industrial sector development through national oil company and/or local contractor 
companies, infrastructure development and government take for the state budget, while 
conversely, countries which did not fully implement a separated functions administrative 
model did not address these factors, this hypothesis will be confirmed.
4. Data and methodology
In order to test the previously defined hypotheses a comparative data approach, which pro-
vides qualitative observations of petroleum sector performance and administrative design 
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within sample countries as well data regarding the implementation of identified key success 
factors within a sample country’s administrative design, was used. This begins with petro-
leum sector performance evaluation, and then presents observations on how the sample 
countries have addressed administrative design in terms of separated functions, and how 
administrative design reflects key success factors.
4.1. Petroleum sector performance evaluation
As described earlier, petroleum sector performance within sample countries is qualitatively 
evaluated according to the government take and available historical data on exploration 
and production activities. Government take means the percentage of profit from petroleum 
production activities which goes directly to the state budget, and is based on the adopted 
fiscal regime. Due to the fact that actual production quantities are different within sample 
countries and are very dependent on a country’s geological potential, which cannot be 
influenced, the focus will be on government take percentage, which shows the capability 
of a country to generate profit from petroleum sector. Government take is calculated on 
one production field, with the same calculations input for each country such as revenues 
for oil produced, oil reserves, period of production and capital and operating expenditures. 
What makes the difference in terms of government take percentage is fiscal regime, which is 
different in each country in terms of regulated payments for the state budget on produced 
volume. For the purpose of this study it is important to see, among the selected countries, 
which countries are better in generating profit under the assumption that all inputs such 
as petroleum productions (reserves), petroleum prices, and exploration and production 
costs are the same, while only the taxation system is different (such as rents, royalty and 
similar taxes which go directly to the state budget based on petroleum produced). Inputs 
for government take calculations are shown in Table 1. Correspondingly, countries with 
greater geological potential in terms of petroleum reserves generate higher profits. Since this 
study is primarily focused on showing that petroleum sector performance can be increased 
through suitable administrative design, which is not dependent on petroleum reserve vol-
umes, petroleum reserves will not be taken into consideration, but rather consistency in 
exploration and production activities through the history. All selected countries have some 
Table 1. summary of fiscal regime calculations in terms of government take for selected countries.























norway 10 17,25 100 167,91 57,89 5,25 32 80
U.k. 10 17,25 100 537,42 245,51 3,73 72 62
Germany 10 17,25 100 341,34 132,14 4,74 43 60
nether-
lands
10 17,25 100 216,45 93,70 3,94 56
75
Denmark 10 17,25 100 266,73 108,19 4,45 48 69
cyprus 10 17,25 100 264,70 108,49 4,25 43 69
albania 10 17,25 100 349,91 145,91 4,41 49 59
italy 10 17,25 100 379,44 157,30 4,42 51 56
Greece 10 17,25 100 578,83 263,02 3,78 72 32
malta 10 17,25 100 320,49 137,30 4,15 51 63
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geological potential and are involved in exploration and production activities, and what 
is most important is similarity in terms of political stability and institutional quality, as 
explained in the introductory part of this study.
Government take data is extracted for each country individually and the countries are 
differentiated into two groups: countries which have incorporated into their regulations a 
fiscal regime model where the government take is greater than 50%, and countries where 
the government take is less or equal to 50%. As discussed earlier in theoretical background, 
studies by Johnston (1994, 2003) have shown that in implementing a balanced fiscal regime, 
those countries which were able to attract exploration and production activities with higher 
government take are in a better position to create wealth for the nation. This finding assumes 
that geological potential is similar due to the fact that for every barrel of oil extracted, the 
country will gain more petroleum profit. Therefore, for evaluation purposes, countries which 
have implemented a government take greater than 50% will be evaluated as countries with 
good petroleum sector performance, but only if the requirement of consistent exploration 
and production activities is met. If a country has a government take less than or equal to 
50%, it will be evaluated as a country with poor petroleum sector performance. In order to 
achieve good petroleum sector performance, a country needs to meet both requirements 
when it comes to government take and consistency in exploration and production activities.
Evaluation of exploration and production activities is based on historical data for each of 
the 10 selected countries in terms of consistency of exploration and production activities. 
If a country has a history of both exploration and production activities and is consistently 
attracting new investments in exploration activities by awarding oil companies with explo-
ration rights, it is evaluated as a country with high exploration and production activities. If 
a country does not demonstrate consistency in exploration and production activities, it is 
evaluated as a country with low exploration and production activities. Petroleum production 
data ranking within sample countries is summarised in Table 2. Data shows that North Sea 
petroleum-producing countries have better ranking than Mediterranean petroleum-pro-
ducing countries. This ranking is based only on petroleum production, and therefore explo-
ration activities when it comes to consistency in attracting new investments are analysed 
further in this study in order to properly evaluate exploration and production activities. 
From the data, presented in Table 2, it can be concluded that North Sea petroleum-pro-
ducing countries are better positioned when it comes to petroleum production activities.
Table 2. Ranking based on total production activities for selected countries.
source: i.h.s. Energy, Petroleum Economics and Policy solutions (P.E.P.s.), 2016.
Country
Total production (mboed)
Last 5 years Last 5 years rank Last 10 years Last 10 years rank
norway 3.404 12 3.773 10
U.k. 1.615 21 2.156 18
netherlands 1.206 29 1.238 29
Denmark 272 48 358 44
italy 229 51 236 55
Germany 211 53 261 51
albania 21 84 17 84
Greece 2 101 2 101
malta 0 113 0 113
cyprus 0 113 0 113
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Finally, countries which have a government take greater than 50% and high explora-
tion and production activities were ranked with good petroleum sector performance, 
while countries which do not meet both requirements have been ranked as countries 
with poor petroleum sector performance. The petroleum sector performance results are 
summarised in Table 3. As argued earlier, studies by Johnston suggest that countries with 
a balanced government take are more efficient in attracting investments in exploration 
and production activities as well as in creating wealth for the nation, since the two are 
linked. New investments will improve production volumes, which will increase govern-
ment take in terms of petroleum profit. Moreover, it can be concluded that countries 
with a balanced government take are good petroleum sector performance countries 
due to the fact that they consistently attract new investments and exhibit consistency 
in exploration and production operations.
4.1.1 North Sea petroleum-producing countries
According to the available data, Norway has a government take of 80%. Petroleum produc-
tion in Norway was developed in 1971, and has constantly increased since then. Norway is 
continually developing exploration activities and awarding oil companies with exploration 
rights on a yearly basis. In 2011, Norway was the world’s seventh largest oil exporter and 
14th largest oil producer, and the world’s third largest gas exporter and sixth largest gas 
producer. The U.K. has a government take of 62%. Exploration and production activities in 
the U.K. have been on-going since 1964 and, as in Norway, the U.K. is continually attract-
ing new investments in exploration and production activities and improving production 
volumes. Germany started its exploration and production activities in 1987. Production 
developed to date is primarily from the same petroleum reserves which were discovered in 
the 1980s. In recent years, there has been no significant exploration activity in terms of new 
discoveries. The government take in Germany is 60%. The Netherlands has a government 
take of 75%. Since 1959 when the first gas discovery was made, the Netherlands became the 
largest producer and exporter of gas in the European Union. The Netherlands produces both 
natural gas and oil, and is continually working on attracting new investments in exploration 
activities. Denmark started exploration activities in 1966, followed by production activities 
in 1972. Since then, Denmark has constantly attracted exploration activities and awarded 
exploration permits. The government take in Denmark is 69%.
Table 3. summary of petroleum sector performance for selected countries.
source: author.
Country Government take in percentage
Exploration and production 
activities Petroleum sector performance
norway Greater than 50% high Good
U.k. Greater than 50% high Good
Germany Greater than 50% Low Poor
netherlands Greater than 50% high Good
Denmark Greater than 50% high Good
cyprus Greater than 50% Low Poor
albania Greater than 50% Low Poor
italy Greater than 50% high Good
Greece Less or equal to 50% Low Poor
malta Greater than 50% Low Poor
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4.1.2 Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries
Cyprus initiated exploration activities in 2007 when 13 exploration permits were issued 
to oil companies. Cyprus is still in the exploration phase, with no commercial production. 
The government take in Cyprus is 69%. Albania’s oil production started in the 1960s, but 
new investments in exploration and production activities started after the 1990s when 
the Albanian government attracted oil companies to invest in new exploration activities. 
Albania has demonstrated no consistency in enabling new exploration activities from the 
beginning of its petroleum sector development. The government take in Albania is 59%. In 
Italy, exploration activities began in 1950, and since then Italy has constantly awarded oil 
companies with exploration rights. Italy currently has 117 exploration permits in place and 
is developing new production facilities. Since the 1970s, Italy has been producing natural 
gas and oil, in both offshore and onshore Italy. Government take in Italy is 56%. Greece 
started exploration activities in the 1970s and oil production commenced in 1981. Since 
then, Greece has not attracted any significant investments in exploration and production 
activities until 2013, when Greece managed to award oil companies with three exploration 
permits. The government take in Greece is 32%. Malta has awarded exploration acreage 
and entered into agreements with oil companies since 2010, and has started to perform 
exploration activities according to the agreements entered. Due to the fact that Malta started 
its first exploration activities recently, it has not yet developed commercial production. The 
government take in Malta is 63%.
The petroleum sector performance results summarised in Table 3 highlight that North Sea 
petroleum-producing countries have better petroleum sector performance compared with 
Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries. As shown on Chart 1, 80% of selected North 
Sea petroleum-producing countries have good petroleum sector performance, while only 20% of 
selected Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries have good petroleum sector performance.
4.2. Administrative design and key success factors analysis within sample 
countries
As already addressed under theoretical background, Norway has implemented a separated 
functions administrative design since 1972 which differentiates policy, regulatory and com-
mercial responsibilities.
Chart 1. Petroleum sector performance for selected countries. source: author.
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The U.K. has, to a certain extent, implemented the Norwegian Model. When it comes 
to policy-making and development responsibilities, these are organised under a separate 
policy-making body which in the U.K. is the Minister of State for Energy (Secretary for 
Energy and Climate Change) and is very similar to Norway where the policy-making body 
is under the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. The regulatory body responsible for super-
vision and control of technical and environmental protection requirements as well as for 
maximising petroleum profit is separate from the policy-making body, and is organised 
within a government agency called The Oil and Gas Authority (O.G.A.). Commercial func-
tions were historically separated and represented through British Petrol, the U.K. national 
oil company, which was privatised under Margaret Thatcher’s government, and the British 
National Oil Corporation (B.N.O.C.), which was acquired by British Petrol in 1988. Today, 
British Petrol is a multinational company and is one of the world’s major oil and gas compa-
nies. According to data published by U.K. Trade and Investment on 24 September 2014, the 
U.K.’s oil and gas industry is the largest industrial sector in the U.K., being a vital part of the 
U.K. economy which supports the employment of 450,000 people across the country and 
generates around £40 billion each year, including over £14 billion in exports. According to 
the available data related to regulatory framework structure and practical functioning, the 
U.K. addressed key success factors which we have identified in this study in the theoretical 
background (BIO by Deloitte (2014)). Governance and control of the petroleum sector are 
organised and structured at the national level, together with strict environmental protec-
tion requirements and technical standards, all of them being incorporated in U.K. binding 
laws. A part of the U.K. binding laws is a fiscal regime model which defines government 
take in terms of petroleum profit. From the very beginning of exploration and production 
operations, the U.K. insisted on using local industry and services as well as infrastructure 
development, which resulted in a strong petroleum industry which is today a vital part of 
the U.K. economy.
Germany has developed a very complex administrative design which is organised on a 
regional rather than a federal level. At the federal level, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Energy has developed a mining law which addresses unified rules regarding exploration 
and production activities. Exploration and production rights, however, are awarded to oil 
companies on a regional level, and the procedure and regulatory responsibilities can differ 
from region to region. Therefore, there is no clear distinction between the policy-making 
and regulatory bodies. Even though Germany developed some of the major global energy 
companies (R.W.E., EON and SIEMENS), a commercial body is not regulated in Germany 
since Germany does not have a national oil company, and is therefore exclusively focused 
on oil companies operating within Germany. According to available data, Germany has very 
little domestic oil and natural gas production and relies heavily on imports (International 
Energy Agency, 2013). Regulatory framework data demonstrates that Germany has failed 
to address some of the key success factors identified earlier (BIO by Deloitte (2014)). Even 
though Germany has implemented high environment protection and technological stand-
ards as well as a fiscal regime model which defines government take in terms of petro-
leum profit, Germany has failed to address governance and control of petroleum sector 
on a national level as well as requirements and preferences of local industry involvement. 
However, Germany has managed to develop energy infrastructure and build strong energy 
industries on other energy resources (International Energy Agency, 2013).
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The Netherlands has organised policy and regulatory responsibilities within different 
divisions under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. They are separated in terms of respon-
sibilities for policy development and exploration and permitting production rights, as well 
as control of technical and environment protection requirements and petroleum profit 
collection. Moreover, the Netherlands has a separate commercial body which is organised 
as the national oil company, E.B.N., and participates in all exploration and production 
activities. According to the available data, the Netherlands addresses key success factors 
within its binding laws regarding governance and control of the petroleum sector on a 
national level, strict environmental protection requirements and technical standards, a fiscal 
regime model as well as requirements for local industry participation and infrastructure 
development (BIO by Deloitte (2014)). The Netherlands insists on the participation of the 
national oil company in petroleum operations. In addition to the national oil company, a 
multinational oil company, Royal Dutch Shell, was developed in the Netherlands; this is 
one of the world’s major oil and gas companies. Shell is vertically integrated and is active 
in every area of the oil and gas industry, including exploration and production, refining, 
distribution and marketing, petrochemicals, power generation and trading, and employs 
94,000 employees in more than 70 countries.
Denmark has implemented an administrative design model of separated functions within 
three different bodies. The policy body is organised within the Ministry of Climate, Energy 
and Building while the regulatory body is organised within the Danish Energy Agency 
(D.E.A.). The commercial body is organised within the national oil company, Danish Oil 
and Natural Gas (D.O.N.G.). The Danish government has a majority share in D.O.N.G. 
ownership. D.O.N.G. actively participates in Danish exploration and production activi-
ties. According to the available data, Denmark has addressed key success factors within its 
binding laws (BIO by Deloitte (2014)). Moreover, besides the national oil company, another 
Danish oil and gas company, Maersk Oil, was established in 1962 and is actively included 
in North Sea petroleum operations.
Cyprus has a separate policy and regulatory body but has failed to organise commer-
cial responsibilities within government bodies. The policy-making body is the Ministry of 
Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, while regulatory functions are organised within 
the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority. Cyprus does not have a national oil company. 
According to the available data, Cyprus has failed to implement petroleum industry devel-
opment key success factors and has not organised a government body involved in petroleum 
operations (BIO by Deloitte (2014)).
Albania has developed a policy and regulatory body within the Ministry of Energy and 
Industry. There is no clear separation of policy and regulatory functions in terms of award-
ing exploration and production rights and petroleum profit collection. With regards to a 
commercial body, Albania has established the national oil company, Albpetrol, in order to 
have active participation in exploration and production activities, even though ongoing 
petroleum operations in Albania are managed by international companies operating in 
Albania. Albania has not addressed petroleum industry and infrastructure development 
within its administrative design.
Italy has organised policy and regulatory responsibilities within different divisions under 
the Ministry for Economic Development. They are separated in terms of responsibilities for 
policy development and permitting exploration and production rights as well as petroleum 
profit collection. Moreover, Italy has a commercial body with the multinational Italian oil 
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company, E.N.I., as a shareholder with 30.1% of shares. E.N.I. is one of the world’s leading 
oil and gas companies. According to the available data Italy has addressed all key success 
factors within its binding laws (BIO by Deloitte (2014)).
Greece has organised policy and regulatory functions within the Ministry of Environment, 
Energy and Climate Change. The two functions are not separated into independent bodies. 
A commercial body is organised within the national oil company, Hellenic Hydrocarbon 
Resources Management S.A., which is not involved in existing petroleum operations in 
Greece. According to the available data, the involvement of national companies in petroleum 
operations has not been addressed within Greece’s laws and regulations (BIO by Deloitte 
(2014)).
Malta has separate policy and regulatory bodies but has not organised commercial 
responsibilities within a government body. Policy and regulatory bodies are both inde-
pendently organised within the Ministry for Transport and Infrastructure. Malta does not 
have a national oil company. According to the available data, Malta has not addressed 
petroleum industry development key success factors and does not have a government body 
involved in petroleum operations (BIO by Deloitte (2014)).
The separated functions administrative design analysis within sample countries, which 
is summarised in Table 4, highlights that North Sea petroleum-producing countries have 
implemented this type of petroleum governance, while Mediterranean petroleum-producing 
countries have not. As shown on Chart 2, 80% of the selected North Sea petroleum-pro-
ducing countries have a separated functions administrative design, while only 20% of the 
selected Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries have implement this.
5. Results and conclusion
The data from the above case studies presents a summary of the administrative design of 
petroleum sector management within sample countries. The analysed data also summarises 
if a sample country has based their administrative design on key success factors which were 
identified in the theoretical background.
From the data analysed, it can easily be concluded that North Sea petroleum-produc-
ing countries have better petroleum sector performance than Mediterranean petroleum- 
producing countries due to the fact that they have implemented a separated functions admin-
istrative design and addressed the previously identified key success factors. As shown in 
Table 3, all North Sea petroleum-producing countries, except Germany, have good petroleum 
Table 4. summary of policy, regulatory and commercial functions organisation for selected countries.
source: author.
Country Policy-making functions Regulatory functions Commercial functions
norway Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body)
U.k. Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body)
Germany no no no
netherlands Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body)
Denmark Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body)
cyprus Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) no
albania no no Yes (separated body)
italy Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body)
Greece no no Yes (separated body)
malta Yes (separated body) Yes (separated body) no
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sector performance, and as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 all of them, except Germany, have 
implemented a separated functions administrative design and addressed key success factors. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Germany could improve its petroleum sector perfor-
mance by implementing a separated functions administrative design and addressing the 
identified key success factors. Moreover, most of the Mediterranean petroleum-producing 
countries have poor petroleum sector performance, as shown in Table 3, except Italy. Due 
to the fact that Italy has implemented a separated functions administrative design and 
addressed the key success factors, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5, it can be concluded that 
most of the Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries have poor petroleum sector 
performance due to the administrative design model, and that they could easily influence 
petroleum sector performance by changing petroleum governance.
As shown in Table 6, case study data supports Hypothesis 1. A positive correlation was 
found between countries which have, to a certain extent, implemented the Norwegian Model 
of separated functions administrative design and petroleum sector performance. Out of 10 
sample countries, five countries together with Norway are North Sea petroleum-producing 
countries, and five are Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries. A separated functions 
administrative design is, to varying degrees, implemented in four North Sea petroleum-pro-
ducing countries together with Norway, and in one Mediterranean petroleum-producing 
Chart 2. Petroleum governance for selected countries. source: author.
















norway Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U.k. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Germany no Yes no Yes Yes
netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
cyprus Yes Yes no Yes Yes
albania Yes Yes no no Yes
italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes no Yes no
malta Yes Yes no Yes Yes
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country. Based on this it can be concluded that North Sea petroleum-producing countries 
are more successful in implementing a separated functions administrative design model. 
All of the Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries which were included in this study, 
except for Italy, have, to a certain extent, implemented a regulatory framework similar to the 
one in Norway and have separated some of the functions within their administrative design, 
but have not completely implemented the Norwegian Model. North Sea petroleum-pro-
ducing countries including the U.K., the Netherlands and Denmark have implemented a 
separated functions administrative design model similar to the one in Norway, and have 
differentiated policy, regulatory and commercial functions. It is shown that those countries 
in comparison with others have also demonstrated good rather than poor petroleum sector 
performance, which generally supports the hypothesis that exportability of the Norwegian 
Model in terms of separated policy, regulatory and commercial functions between different 
government bodies is correlated with good petroleum sector performance.
Case study data generally supports Hypothesis 2. In Table 7, implementation of the key 
success factors identified in the theoretical background has been correlated with petroleum 
sector performance. Countries which have addressed all the key success factors identified in 
Table 5 are labelled ‘yes’ and countries which have not addressed all identified key success 
factors are labelled ‘no’. According to the data summarised in Table 7, it is shown that all 
countries which have achieved ‘good’ petroleum sector performance have implemented 
all identified key success factors, while countries that have not implemented all key suc-
cess factors have ‘poor’ petroleum sector performance. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
countries which have addressed key success factors in their administrative design have 
better petroleum sector performance, and this confirms the hypothesis that countries can 
improve their petroleum sector performance by addressing key success factors in their 
administrative design.
Based on data in Tables 6 and 7, it can further be concluded that countries which have 
implemented the Norwegian Model have addressed all the identified key success factors, 
as opposed to those countries which did not implement the Norwegian Model. This is very 
important in terms of confirmation of Hypothesis 3. As shown in the theoretical back-
ground, stakeholders’ expectations are met if the identified key success factors are addressed 
within a country’s regulatory framework. Table 5 demonstrates that countries which have 
addressed the key success factors in their administrative design have met stakeholders’ 
expectations. Case analysis on the sample countries shows that only countries which have a 
Table 6. summary of separated functions administrative design and petroleum sector performance for 
selected countries.
source: author.











136   B. DORIC AND V. DIMOVSKI
separated functions administrative design have also addressed all identified key success fac-
tors in their administrative design. This supports Hypothesis 3, and therefore suggests that 
countries with a separated functions administrative design meet stakeholders’ expectations.
The foregoing results and discussion shows that a separated functions administrative 
design which is differentiated within policy, regulatory and commercial body has the ability 
to address the identified key success factors which, in turn, has an impact on petroleum 
sector performance. Moreover, countries with better petroleum sector performance have a 
separated functions administrative design. This study clearly demonstrates that North Sea 
petroleum-producing countries are more successful than Mediterranean petroleum-pro-
ducing countries in administrative design development and petroleum sector performance. 
It can also be concluded that North Sea petroleum-producing countries are very similar in 
terms of how they manage the petroleum sector, and are more successful in comparison with 
Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries. Moreover, Mediterranean petroleum-pro-
ducing countries can be differentiated between Italy, which has implemented a separated 
functions administrative model, and Cyprus, Albania, Greece and Malta. Cyprus, Albania, 
Greece and Malta have incorporated the Norwegian Model in their regulatory framework to 
some degree but not fully, and have significant room for improvement in terms of petroleum 
sector performance. It can be concluded that Mediterranean petroleum-producing countries 
have poor petroleum sector performance due to the deficiency of the administrative design 
model which they have implemented, and thus the petroleum sector performance could 
be positively improved by implementing the separated functions administrative design in 
which the identified key success factors are incorporated (Norwegian Model). This is also 
applicable for Germany, since the study shows that Germany has poor petroleum sector 
performance compared with other North Sea petroleum-producing countries and is the only 
country which did not implement a separated function administrative design. Moreover, it 
can be concluded that changes in petroleum governance through implementation of a sep-
arated functions administrative design will positively impact petroleum sector performance 
in countries with a stable democracy which have institutional quality and political stability.
This study, which was done on a basis that a country has institutional quality and political 
stability, indicates that a country will improve petroleum sector performance and address the 
identified key success factors by implementing a separated functions administrative design. 
This will not only meet stakeholders’ expectations, but will, more importantly, manage the 
petroleum sector to create wealth for the nation and ensure transparency and sustainabil-
ity. It can be concluded that without a sustainable administrative design for managing the 
Table 7. summary of key success factors and petroleum sector performance for selected countries.
source: author.
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petroleum sector, a country is like a sleeping beauty; it will awake to its full potential once 
it has implemented proper administrative design.
Notes
1.  Fiscal regime or the petroleum taxation model is based on various financial terms which an 
oil company needs to pay to the country if performing exploration and production activities. 
Fiscal regime is usually shown as a government take versus oil company take when it comes 
to petroleum profit. Government take means percentage of profit from petroleum production 
activities which goes directly to the state budget, while oil company take means percentage of 
profit which remains within the oil company. Fiscal regime is something which differentiates 
countries in terms of attractiveness for the oil companies when doing evaluation analysis 
in terms of entering into business in a particular country. There are 145 countries around 
the world which have specific fiscal and contractual terms for engaging with oil companies 
for the conduct of petroleum exploration and production operations. These arrangements, 
known generally as fiscal regimes, can be divided into two categories: production sharing 
and royalty tax based. This classification of fiscal regimes is simply an industry convenience, 
as there is often substantial variation between contracts or terms within a given regime type. 
The fundamental difference between the two systems comes down to the ownership of the 
produced petroleum. Neither type of regime is better or worse than the other due to the 
fact that from an economic perspective the same objectives can be achieved under different 
regimes.
2.  For case study analysis the most recent data provided by three different management 
consulting companies was used. Data which was published in 2015 by Ernst and Young 
consulting company in The Global Oil and Tax Guide and which summarises oil and gas tax 
regimes in 84 countries was used for fiscal regime analysis. For administrative design analysis, 
regulatory framework and exploration and production operations data which was published 
in 2014 by B.I.O. by Deloitte consulting company in a final report prepared for the European 
Commission Civil liability, financial security and compensation claims for offshore oil and 
gas activities in the European Economic Area was used. As a backup for both, fiscal regime 
and regulatory framework data published in 2016 by I.H.S. consulting services for sample 
countries published in Global Exploration and Production Services reports was used, as well 
as available data from the Petroleum Economics and Policy Solutions (P.E.P.S.) database.
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